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Many of the risks covered by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are also covered by 
political risk insurance (PRI). Although there are important differences between PRI and 
BITs, both in terms of coverage and underlying purpose, the considerable overlap between 
the two instruments suggest that PRI providers should take BITs into account when 
assessing the risk of investment projects. But while the relationship between BITs and PRI 
has often been alleged to be considerable,1 in practice there is practically no publicly 
available evidence to sustain this assumption. This Perspective reviews evidence from a 
recent survey of officials in private and public (or mixed private/public) PRI providers.2  
 
Government-sponsored agencies 
Several governments provide their investors abroad with insurance against political risks, 
and a few of these, such as those of Germany and France, make their guarantees contingent 
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on investments being covered by BITs. This is notable because practically all BITs allow 
government-sponsored PRI agencies to “subrogate” insured investors’ claims against host 
countries, thereby providing a legal basis for the government’s insurance agency to recover 
benefits paid out to investors. These programs are an exception, however, in that most 
public investment guarantee programs do not incorporate BITs as a precondition for 
coverage. And while BITs may at times provide comfort when PRI agencies of capital-
exporting states issue guarantees in risky jurisdictions, interviews with officials from nine 
of them3 indicate that it is exceptionally rare that the treaties have a decisive impact on 
either coverage or pricing. 
 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
For MIGA insurance, a foreign investment has adequate legal protection if covered by a 
BIT, and the treaties are relevant for other parts of MIGA’s operational regulations as well. 
But whereas BITs may thereby make the underwriting process easier within MIGA, the 
treaties are often not crucial. A BIT is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
coverage. And with respect to the pricing of expropriation risk, MIGA has to consider no 
less than 57 rating factors when determining the underwriting premium rates. Only one of 
these relate to the existence of an “investment protection agreement” – a rather broad term 
which covers trade agreements with investment chapters, for instance, the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Suffice it to say that, if countries engage in conduct that signals a scale-back of 
investor protections - such as withdrawing their consent to submit investment disputes to 
international arbitration - that would naturally be factored into MIGA’s underwriting 
decisions. But for developing countries that remain committed to foreign investment and 
the rule of law, past and current high-ranking officials confirm that the absence of a BIT 
rarely impacts pricing or coverage, and is never in itself a sufficient reason for MIGA to 
withhold a guarantee. 
 
Private providers 
As an alternative to public investment guarantee schemes, private companies have offered 
PRI for the past three decades. The survey summarized here included feedback from 
underwriters and senior managers from firms and Lloyds’ syndicates accounting for 
around 50% of the total “confiscation, expropriation and nationalization” capacity of most 
PRI providers. Their feedback may appear surprising to those convinced that BITs are 
crucial for the PRI industry. A few providers incorporate BITs into their products (for 
instance by insuring treaty-based arbitration award defaults), and some occasionally use 
the treaties as a guiding tool when assessing investment risks, but most private firms find 
BITs largely irrelevant for the underwriting process. Naturally, if cancelling or failing to 
honor existing BITs can be taken as signals that a host country plans to weaken its investor 
protections, this will be noted and taken into account (as with MIGA). But for developing 
countries that treat foreign investors fairly and in a non-discriminatory way, BITs very 
rarely provide a “positive return” in the private industry’s underwriting process.  
 
Conclusion 
Naturally, what has been discussed here is only one out of several possible links between 
BITs and PRI. An additional—and obviously related—question is the relevance of BITs 
when PRI providers resolve claims with host governments. This remains almost entirely 
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unexplored in the literature due to the short supply of information about the PRI industry. 
The conclusion is nevertheless notable: While BITs are basically aimed at reducing the risk 
of investing abroad, many agencies that price the risk of foreign investments rarely take 
them into account. Why might that be? If the reason is ignorance about the potency of 
BITs among some PRI providers, then the treaties should increase in importance once 
more underwriters realize their potential. But even among those well informed about BITs, 
major providers remain sceptical about their practical relevance as a risk-mitigating tool. 
Ultimately, however, it remains to be studied exactly why BITs may be decisive for some 
underwriting decisions, but have nevertheless not had a transformative impact on the 
global market for PRI.  
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